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Abstract 
 
This paper examines whether Asian banks are still prone to moral hazard in the aftermath of 
the 1997 Asian crisis. Using a sample of commercial banks from 12 Asian countries during 
the 2001-2007 period, our empirical findings highlight that higher market power in the 
banking market results in higher instability. Although banks are better capitalized in less 
competitive markets their default risk remains higher. A deeper investigation however shows 
that such a behaviour is dependent on the economic environment. Higher economic growth 
contributes to neutralize higher risk taking and higher instability in less competitive markets.  
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1 Introduction 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis has raised concerns regarding the stability of financial 
systems in Asian countries. Unlike the previous crises characterized by a failure of 
government macroeconomic policies, the 1997 crisis has cast doubts on the process of 
uncontrolled financial liberalization and its implications for the economy as a whole. In the 
Asian context, financial liberalization has indeed resulted in unfettered bank competition on 
the credit market creating bubbles notably in real estate markets (Sachs and Woo, 2000). 
Moreover, the 1997 Asian crisis has also changed the structure of the banking industry 
and the nature of firms‟ corporate governance in Asia. In the banking industry, Asian 
countries have experienced a rapid growth of bank consolidations or mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) that peaked to 25 percent per year as of 2003. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
notably cross-border M&As involving banks in emerging countries, also showed an upward 
trend from US$ 2.5 billion during 1991-1995 to US$ 67.5 billion during 2001-2005 
(Domanski, 2005; Moshirian, 2008). Asia therefore accounts for 36 percent of total bank 
M&As values, the second highest recipient of cross-border bank M&As after Latin America. 
Meanwhile, corporate governance reforms have also been implemented to eliminate 
incentives for imprudent strategies, including excessive short-term borrowing and speculative 
investments
1
.  
With regards to the implications of bank consolidations to rescue distressed banks, 
Berger and Mester (2003) argue that market power gained by banks after consolidation 
increases banks‟ capacity to expand their activity into various products and across national 
borders. This process has lead to the emergence of large “too big to fail” banks and 
potentially to higher moral hazard incentives to exploit government bailout. Meanwhile, 
regarding corporate governance reforms in Asia, firms still face major challenges, such as 
poor accounting systems, non-transparent management, and weak protection for minority 
shareholders (Park, 2006). Because firms significantly depend on banks for their external 
funding (Adams, 2008), bank stability is a major concern for policy makers. Corporate sector 
vulnerability is indeed more likely to affect bank soundness through risk-shifting mechanisms 
in bank-based financial systems (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
   In spite of the importance of such contemporary trends, few studies focus on the 
financial stability implications of bank consolidation in the Asian context. This paper 
contributes to fulfil this gap using a sample of commercial banks from 12 Asian countries that 
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 See Cook (2009) for deeper insights on the corporate governance reforms in various Asian countries.  
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have been affected by the 1997/1998 Asian crisis (China, Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam). 
Specifically, we assess the link between market power in the banking industry and financial 
stability, as bank consolidations in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis can influence the 
degree of competition or market power in the banking industry. We work on a sample 
covering the 2001-2007 period and focus on the role of the economic environment, where we 
investigate the link between bank instability and market power using various risk measures 
and by taking economic growth into consideration.  
 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature 
review on the nexus between bank market power and financial stability and discusses our 
research focus. Section 3 presents our data, variables and descriptive statistics. Section 4 
highlights our econometric specification and methodology. Section 5 discusses our empirical 
findings, while Section 6 provides some sensitivity analyses. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
  
2. Bank market power and financial stability 
 Research on the link between bank competition and financial stability remains 
inconclusive. In the U.S. banking industry, Keeley (1990) is the first to document that greater 
bank competition following financial deregulation in the late eighties has encouraged banks to 
take on more risk, as bank charter value declined. Demsetz et al. (1996) support such findings 
in the U.S banking industry, where banks with higher market power exhibit higher solvency 
ratios and lower asset risk. Bofondi and Ghobi (2004) examine such a relationship for Italian 
banks and find that the loan default rate is positively associated to the number of banks 
operating in the industry. Jimenez et al. (2008) also find a negative impact of the Lerner index 
on risk-taking in Spanish banks. In a cross-country setting, Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2007) 
document that competition in banking erodes bank stability in Latin America. Yet, Beck et al. 
(2006) examine the effect of bank concentration on the probability of banking crises instead 
of considering bank risk taking issues. Working on 69 countries during the 1980-1997 period, 
their empirical results highlight that countries with less competitive banking systems are less 
prone to banking crisis than the ones with greater bank competition. To sum up, the positive 
link between bank market power and financial stability is known as the “charter value” 
hypothesis in the literature. 
 Conversely, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) develop an alternative view on the link 
between bank market power and financial stability, which is often referred to as the 
“competition-stability” hypothesis. By considering competition in both deposit and loan 
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markets, higher market power in the deposit market will drive banks to increase their loan 
interest rate. Such bank behaviour raises entrepreneurial moral hazard which in turn increases 
banks‟ default risk through risk-shifting mechanisms following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
Boyd et al. (2006) further provide empirical evidence for the “competition-stability 
hypothesis” based on US data. Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) also support the competition-
stability hypothesis using European data. Moreover, they also show that the concentration-
fragility nexus is more likely to occur in the less developed countries of Eastern Europe.  
 In the meantime, some studies also consider bank capital ratios in the relationship 
between bank competition and financial stability. Schaeck and Cihák (2007) document that a 
competitive banking market drives banks to hold higher capital ratios to preserve their 
competitive advantages on their peers. On the contrary, Berger et al. (2009) show that higher 
bank market power enhances bank capitalization. Furthermore, their empirical results suggest 
that although higher bank market power increases non-performing loans, such trends are 
associated with a decrease in bank default risk. This is because the levels of capitalization in 
banks with higher market power are sufficient to cover an increase in banks' non-performing 
loans and hence, bank stability is not affected.  
 Our paper builds on the work of Berger et al. (2009), Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009), 
Schaeck and Cihák (2007), and Soedarmono et al. (2011), and extends it in other directions. 
First, Berger et al. (2009) estimate the degree of bank-level market power, while our paper 
estimates the degree of market power for the whole banking system in order to account for 
bank consolidation trends that may change the degree of competition in the banking market. 
In this aspect, our conception of bank consolidation is close to Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009). 
However, we do not consider the implication of bank consolidations through the bank 
concentration channel as in Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009), but through the degree of market 
power in the banking market
2
. Second, we focus on the impact of bank competition on bank 
capitalization, insolvency risk and risk taking measured by the volatility of returns rather than 
the extent of non-performing loans. Risk taking refers to an ex-ante action while a risk 
measure based on non-performing loans indicates an ex-post condition. To prevent the 
excessive accumulation of non-performing loans that may contribute to the occurrence of a 
financial crisis, raising concerns on bank moral hazard that leads to excessive risk taking is an 
important dimension. Third, we also consider the influence of macroeconomic performance 
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on the nexus between bank competition and financial stability following Schaeck and Cihák 
(2007).  
 Schaeck and Cihák (2007) analyze the impact of country-level per capita income on 
the link between bank competition and the capital ratio, while we focus on the role of 
economic growth in the competition-stability nexus in banking. In this sense our work is also 
related to the literature on the procyclicality of bank capital buffer, showing that banks hold 
lower capital as economic growth increases (Ayuso et al, 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008). 
Hence, higher economic expansion could therefore affect the impact of bank competition on 
capital ratios that in turn could influence bank income volatility and insolvency risk
3
. Our 
paper follows and adds to Soedarmono et al. (2011) who investigate the competition-stability 
nexus for Asian banks showing that higher market power is associated with higher instability 
except during the 1997 financial crisis period. In their setting they do not consider the role 
played by economic growth in the risk taking implications of the degree of bank competition.  
  
3. Data sources, variables and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Data sources 
 Our data come from several sources and consist of bank-specific and country-specific 
data. For bank-specific data, we start by taking from BankScope Fitch-IBCA a set of annual 
series for the 1999-2007 period. We consider commercial banks in 12 Asian countries. These 
include China (137)
 4
, Hong Kong (53), India (74), Indonesia (80), Malaysia (51), Pakistan 
(30), Philippines (41), South Korea (21), Sri Lanka (14), Taiwan (49), Thailand (23), and 
Vietnam (34). Our bank sample consists of 607 commercial banks. For country-specific data, 
we use several datasets such as the International Financial Statistics from the International 
Monetary Fund, the Financial Structure database from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009), the 
Governance Indicator index from Kaufmann et al (2008), and the Economic Freedom index 
from Heritage Foundation.  
 
3.2 Bank Market Power  
Claessens and Laeven (2004) argue that bank performance measures do not 
appropriately indicate the degree of bank market power because such measures can be 
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 The issue of procyclicality of bank capital is beyond the scope of this paper but taking into account the role of 
economic growth in the link between market power and bank stability is an important dimension. As higher 
economic growth improves borrowers' financial health, it might also enable banks to increase their profitability 
without undertaking excessive risk. 
4
 The values in parentheses represent the number of banks obtained.  
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affected by various bank-level and country-level characteristics. Therefore, the degree of bank 
competition should be determined endogenously. In a similar vein, Beck (2008) highlights 
that using measures of bank market structure and concentration ratios to assess the degree of 
bank market power is inappropriate, since such measures do not account for differences in 
bank strategies. Consequently, such indicators merely indicate the actual market share of each 
bank. They do not necessarily measure bank competition captured by the degree of bank 
market power. 
 Meanwhile, the use of the H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987) can be an 
alternative method to infer the degree of market power in the banking industry (Claessens and 
Laeven, 2004; Molyneux and Nguyen-Linh, 2008). Nevertheless, a critical feature of the H 
statistic is that the Panzar-Rosse approach must be applied on the basis of observations that 
are in long-run equilibrium (Bikker and Bos, 2008). An equilibrium test needs to be 
conducted by equalizing adjusted rates of return across banks. At equilibrium, the rates of 
return will not be correlated with input prices. When the equilibrium test is rejected, then the 
H estimates should be interpreted with great caution, as they may be based on observations 
from a disequilibrium situation. 
 For such reasons, we use the new industrial organisation approach following Uchida 
and Tsutsui (2005), Brissimis et al (2008), and Soedarmono et al. (2011) to quantify the 
degree of market power in Asian banking. We thereby obtain a more tractable measure of 
bank competition. The merit of this non-structural measure of bank competition is to provide 
the estimates of the degree of banking industry market power in each period.  Furthermore, 
this measure does not require any information on the market structure of each bank. 
Eventually, this method allows us to endogeneously determine the degree of market power in 
the banking industry. More specifically, we estimate a system of three equations that 
correspond to a translog cost function, to a revenue function obtained from bank profit 
maximization, and to an inverse loan demand function. This system is shown in System (1).  
 
 7 
  
     
        
      
      
  D
itittitit
S
itititit
it
it
it
ititititititit
t
t
it
C
ititititititit
ititititititit
eOPLgGDPGgqgp
ewbqbdbb
d
q
C
dbwbqbbcqrRR
ewdbdqbwqb
wbwbdbdbqbqbbC





lnlnln/1ln
lnlnln
lnlnln
lnlnlnlnlnln
ln
2
1
lnln
2
1
lnln
2
1
lnln
210
9843
8721
987
2
65
2
43
2
210



        (1) 
 
In defining revenue, we follow Brissimis et al (2008) using total revenue from both 
interest and non-interest revenue. This construction allows us to implicitly capture the 
different strategies followed by banks in shifting part of their activities to non-interest income 
activities. Considering total revenue also allows us to account for earnings generated by assets 
other than loans
5
. Variables with bars represent deviations from their cross-sectional means in 
each time period, where this procedure is to cope with multicollinearity. The degree of market 
power in the banking industry in each year is given by  1,0
t
  representing the well-known 
conjectural variations elasticity of total industry outputs with respect to the output of the i-th 
bank. In the case of perfect competition, 0
t
  ; under pure monopoly, 1
t
  ; and finally, 
0
t
 implies pricing below marginal cost and could result, for example from a non-
optimizing behavior of banks. In the special case of Cournot competition, 
it
  is simply 
referred to as the market share of the i-th bank.   
Moreover, 
it
C  is defined as total expenses from both interest and non-interest income 
activities, 
it
q  as total earning assets, 
it
d  as total deposits and short-term funding, 
it
w  as the 
ratio of operating expenses to total assets, 
it
R  as total revenue, 
it
r  as the ratio of interest 
expenses to total deposits, and 
it
p  as the ratio of total revenue to total earning assets. 
Meanwhile, 
t
GDPG  and 
it
OPL  are factors that affect demand, defined as the real gross 
domestic product growth rate, and the ratio of operating expenses to total loans, respectively. 
Following Brissimis et al (2008) and Soedarmono et al. (2011), System (1) is estimated 
country by country. To estimate 
t
  we use dummy variables for each year, while to estimate 
  we use time dummy variables every two years due to the fact that   values are linearly 
dependent on the time-specific control variable (GDPG).  
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3.3. Financial stability 
 In this paper, financial stability is captured by bank income volatility, insolvency risk 
and capitalization. In order to measure bank income volatility that reflects bank risk-taking 
strategies, we use the standard deviation of banks‟ return on average assets (SDROA) and that 
of banks‟ return on average equity (SDROE). SDROA is calculated from the return on average 
assets (ROAA) values taken from period t to t – 2 (a three-period rolling window). 
Analogically, SDORE is calculated from the return on average equity (ROAE) using a three-
period rolling window. This approach is consistent with Agoraki et al. (2011)
6
. 
 To account for bank insolvency risk, we use the Z-score method based on ROAA. The 
Z-score (ZROA) indicates the number of standard deviations that the bank's ROAA has to fall 
below its expected value before equity is completely exhausted. Thus, higher Z-score is 
interpreted as a decrease in bank insolvency risk. ZROA is formulated as follows. 
 
ti
titi
ti
SDROA
EQTAROAA
ZROA
,
,,
,

            (2) 
EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. For robustness, we also consider the Z-score 
measure based on ROAE (ZROE) which is formulated as follows. 
ti
ti
ti
SDROE
ROAE
ZROE
,
,
,
1
             (3) 
 In order to capture the levels of bank capitalization, we use the total risk-based capital 
ratio (CAR) and the equity to total assets ratio (EQTA). EQTA is essentially a measure of 
leverage. The use of such a variable is consistent with Blum (2008) who highlights that the 
leverage ratio can be a tool to discipline bank moral hazard. Meanwhile, CAR is the sum of 
equity capital and other hybrid capital divided by risk-weighted assets. Repullo (2004) argues 
that risk-based capital requirements can overcome bank moral hazard in a competitive market.  
 
3.4. Control variables 
First, we incorporate country-specific control variables. We follow Schaeck and Cihák 
(2007) by considering the inflation rate (INF) and the real gross domestic product growth rate 
(GDPG), since macroeconomic developments are likely to affect the quality of banks‟ assets, 
as well as the level of bank capitalization.  
Second, we also control for bank-specific characteristics. We consider the loan-to-
deposit ratio (LDR) to capture bank liquidity that may affect bank default probability. We 
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 It is worth noting that our study only covers the 2001-2007 period, although our initial sample covers the 1999-
2007 period. This is because our risk indicators are based on a three-year rolling window starting in 2001.  
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further incorporate the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans (LLR) to account for credit 
risk, since credit risk is the major determinant of bank risk and capitalization. In the 
meantime, Foos et al. (2010) also document that excessive loan growth can result in higher 
bank risk and lower capital ratios. We thus include the loan growth rate as a control variable.  
We also control for the differences in technical efficiency following Agoraki et al. (2011) and 
Boyd et al. (2006). Technical efficiency is captured by the ratio of operating expenses to total 
assets (OVERHEAD). Bank size can also be a major factor of higher risk taking due to “too 
big to fail” effects in larger banks (Kane, 2000; Mishkin, 2006). To take into account size 
effects, we incorporate the logarithm of banks‟ total average assets (SIZE) in our estimations.  
 
3.5. Descriptive statistics and the market power index 
 Table 1 presents the “clean” descriptive statistics of our variables after imposing 
several restrictions on our dataset to exclude outliers that may affect our empirical results. 
Our restrictions are as follows. We exclude the 2.5% highest values of LDR, OPL, 
OVERHEAD, ZROA and ZROE because these variables have a right-skewed distribution. For 
OVERHEAD, we further exclude all values that are lower than 0. To this end, Table 2 shows 
the values taken by the Lerner index for each country every year.  
 
4. Econometric model and estimation methodology 
 To assess the impact of bank competition on financial stability, we construct the 
following equation that is consistent with the previous literature (Boyd et al, 2006; Brissimis 
et al, 2008; Agoraki et al, 2011; Soedarmono et al, 2011). 
titjitjitji
tjitjitjtjtjtji
SIZEOVERHEADLOANG
LLRLDRINFGDPGLERNERSTABILITY
,,,7,,7,,6
,,5,,4,3,2,1,,




     (4) 
where i, j, t indicates bank, country, and time index, respectively. Meanwhile, STABILITY  
represents dependent variables consisting of SDROA, SDROE, ZROA, ZROE, EQTA, and 
CAR.  Moreover, our paper also examines whether the macroeconomic environment 
influences the nexus between bank competition and financial stability. For this purpose, we 
specify the following equation. 
titji
tjitjitjitjitj
tjtjtjtji
SIZE
OVERHEADLOANGLLRLDRINF
GDPGLERNERGDPGLERNERSTABILITY
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                 (5) 
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To estimate (4) and (5), we run Fixed Effect (FE) regressions to correct for 
unobservable bank-specific and time-specific characteristics. We also correct for possible 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems using the appropriate White coefficient 
covariance method.   
Recent empirical literature further sheds light on endogeneity problems in the nexus 
between bank competition and financial stability (Berger et al, 2009; Uhde and Hemishoff, 
2009; Gonzales, 2005; Schaeck and Cihák, 2007). In order to take this issue into account, we 
further endogenize the measure of bank competition by specifying instrumental variables. For 
this purpose, we also estimate (4) and (5) using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
with fixed-effect corrections instead of using the Two-Stages Least Squares (2SLS) method as 
in Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) and Schaeck and Cihák (2007). In this regard, Hall (2005) 
shows that the GMM estimation is robust to the distribution of errors. The GMM estimation 
further accounts for heteroskedasticity and hence, the GMM estimation is more efficient than 
the 2SLS estimation. 
With regards to instrumental variables for LERNER, we consider three 
macroeconomic variables. These include the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
(STOCK), the rule of law index (RLAW), and the economic freedom index (ECOFREE). 
STOCK is retrieved from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009), while RLAW and ECOFREE are 
taken from Heritage foundation and Kaufmann et al (2008), respectively.  
STOCK is expected to influence LERNER because higher stock market development 
can affect the demand for banking services (Schaeck and Cihák, 2007). As the stock market 
develops, banks will compete with capital markets to preserve bargaining power in the 
market
7
. Moshirian (2009) also points out that greater minority shareholders‟ protection helps 
boosting financial globalization that in turn, affects the degree of competition in the banking 
market. In order to account for the quality of law enforcement that protects minority 
shareholders‟ rights, we consider the rule of law index (RLAW) as one of the instrumental 
variables for LERNER. Finally, we consider the degree of economic freedom (ECOFREE) as 
an instrumental variable for LERNER, as greater economic freedom can lead to new 
investment opportunities. Higher economic freedom is also associated with weaker bank 
activity restrictions, leading to higher sophistication in banking products that may in turn 
affect the degree of bank competition.   
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 See Boot and Thakor (2000) for further discussions on the bank-capital market competition and the inter-bank 
competition.  
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Table 3 shows that such instrumental variables significantly affect the degree of 
market power in the banking market (LERNER). In the Asian context, greater bank 
competition is mainly due to stronger protections for minority shareholders represented by the 
rule of law index (RLAW), while with higher economic freedom and stock market 
development, banking markets appear to be less competitive. 
   
5. Empirical findings   
 In order to analyze the impact of market power in the banking market on bank risk 
taking, insolvency risk and capitalization, we proceed in two steps. First, we investigate the 
link in a general framework. Second, we consider how economic growth influences the link 
between market power in banking and financial stability, where financial stability refers to 
bank risk taking, insolvency risk and capital ratios.  
 Table 4 shows our estimation results from the FE and the GMM regressions. Our 
results highlight that the degree of market power in the banking market (LERNER) is 
positively related to bank income volatility as measured by either SDROA or SDROE. Higher 
LERNER further exacerbates bank insolvency risk (ZROA or ZROE). However, higher 
LERNER is also associated with an increase in capital ratios (EQTA or CAR).  
 These findings indicate that although banks in less competitive markets are able to 
hold higher capital ratios, these levels are not sufficient to cover an increase in bank risk 
taking that in turn exacerbates bank insolvency risk. More precisely, Equation (2) provides a 
straightforward intuition on such empirical findings, where the levels of capitalization are 
insufficient to cover banks‟ risk-taking. Indeed, we observe that banks in less competitive 
markets are able to increase their equity to total assets ratio (EQTA). But according to 
Equation (2), the impact of market power (LERNER) on bank insolvency risk (ZROA) remains 
negative as long as LERNER is positively related to bank income volatiltiy (SDROA) and at 
the same time, a higher value of LERNER increases SDROA more strongly than EQTA. In 
other words, bank moral hazard in less competitive markets is likely to exist. 
  Our findings are consistent with Molyneaux and Nguyen-Linh (2008), Agusman et al. 
(2006), and Soedarmono et al. (2011). Molyneaux and Nguyen-Linh (2008) document that 
higher bank competition reduces risk taking in Southeast Asian banks, while Agusman et al 
(2006) point out that higher charter value in publicly-traded banks in Asia fails to alleviate 
banks‟ asset risk. Our findings are also consistent with Soedarmono et al (2011), even though 
they include financial crises periods in their study.  
 12 
 Our findings do not support the “charter value” hypothesis. More specifically, our 
findings differ from Ariss (2010) who finds that bank-level market power enhances the 
stability of banks in developing countries including some countries in Asia. Such different 
findings can be due to differences in econometric specifications. Ariss (2010) considers a 
cross-section analysis, while our paper employs panel data methodology that takes into 
account both time-specific and bank-specific characteristics. The composition of countries 
used in our study may also explain such differences, since macroeconomic and regulatory 
environements can influence the link between bank competition and financial stability.  
 Previous studies have not accounted for the influence of macroeconomic environments 
on the nexus between bank competition and financial stability. An exception is Schaeck and 
Cihák (2007) who consider the influence of country-level degree of economic development 
on the link between bank competition and capital ratios. Their results indicate that higher 
bank competition as captured by the Panzar-Roose H-statistics tends to alleviate bank capital 
ratios in countries with higher GDP per capita.  
 Following Schack and Cihák (2007), we further investigate whether the 
macroeconomic environment affects the impact of bank competition on bank risk taking, 
insolvency risk and capital ratios. However, in our study we consider the influence of 
economic growth instead of country-level economic development used by Schaeck and Cihák 
(2007). Our sample consists of developing countries with presumably relatively more 
homogeneous economic development levels. More specifically, we follow the steps of 
Soedarmono et al. (2011) who consider the same sample of countries to investigate the impact 
of financial crises on the link between bank competition and risk.  In the present study, we 
focus on the period following the 1997/1998 Asian crisis and extend their approach by 
introducing the effect of economic growth on the competition-stability nexus.  
Table 5 shows our estimation results when we augment our model by introducing the 
interaction term between LERNER and GDPG as an explanatory variable. Following Schaeck 
and Cihák (2007) as well, LERNER*GDPG is treated as an endogenous variable. Our 
empirical results show that higher economic growth brings banks in less competitive markets 
to reduce bank risk taking (SDROA and SDROE), overcome insolvency risk  (ZROA and 
ZROE) and increase the equity to total asset ratio (EQTA)
8
.  
 
                                                 
8
 Although LERNER*GDPG is negatively related to the total risk-based capital ratio (CAR), this result does not 
change the overall intuition with regard to the impact of economic growth on the link between bank competition 
and financial stability. As higher economic growth drives banks in less competitive market to reduce bank total 
risk-based capital ratio, such banks obviously tend to exhibit higher insolvency risks. 
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 6. Sensitivity analyses 
 To check for robustness, we perform several sensitivity analyses in our paper
9
. First, 
we modify the inverse loan demand function (the third equation) as shown in System (1) by 
including the logarithm of total assets (SIZE) as a control variable that influences the pricing 
of banking products. Using this different specification, the empirical findings discussed in 
Section 5 are not altered. Second, we also control for bank income diversification, since non-
interest income can affect bank stability (Lepetit et al, 2008). Considering the ratio of non-
interest income to total gross revenue (NNI) as a control variable does not change our main 
findings. Third, we further control for the macroeconomic environment by incorporating the 
ratio of the five largest banks‟ total assets to the banking system‟s total assets (CFIVE) 
following Schaeck and Cihák (2007). Our main findings remain the same. Fourth, we exclude 
the year 2007 from our sample to isolate the impact of the 2007/2008 financial crisis. The link 
between bank competition and financial stability is not altered. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 The process of bank consolidation is one of the major trends in Asian banking systems 
in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis. As bank consolidations tend to specifically affect 
the degree of bank competition in emerging and developing countries (Jeon et al, 2011), this 
paper examines the link between bank competition and financial stability in the Asian context, 
particularly in the post-1997 crisis period.  
Using a sample of commercial banks in 12 Asian countries over the 2001-2007 period, 
our empirical findings indicate that higher market power in the banking industry is associated 
with better capital adequacy. However, the higher level of bank capitalization in less 
competitive markets is not sufficient to cope with bank moral hazard that induces excessive 
risk taking and exacerbates bank insolvency risk. Nevertheless, our findings also indicate that 
stronger economic growth mitigates higher risk taking behaviour and higher bank instability 
in less competitive markets.  
 On the whole, in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis, Asian banks in general still 
seem to suffer from moral hazard. Higher market power in banking that is expected to 
enhance banks‟ self-discipline still fails to moderate high risk taking strategies. Nevertheless, 
such problems are less likely to occur in expansionary economic environments.  
 
                                                 
9
 The results from these sensitivity analyses are not shown in the paper but are available upon request.  
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Appendix. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 Variables Definition  Mean  Median Max Min  Std. Dev. 
       
Q Total earning assets (million USD) 10580572 717092 863000000 40.874 44235815 
C Total expenses (million USD) 562126 56354 43603212 0.810 2070488 
D 
Total deposit and short term funding (million 
USD) 9576041 682700 804000000 7 39528240 
R Total revenue (million USD) 591999 63988 39037317 1.191 2102181 
W Total operating expenses to total assets  0.5706 0.0211 24.7477 0.0000 2.3346 
R Ratio of interest expenses to total deposits 0.0527 0.0295 9.3901 0.0001 0.3212 
P Ratio of total revenue to total earning assets 0.0859 0.0599 26.5119 0.0001 0.4661 
OPL Ratio of operating expenses to total loans 0.0525 0.0369 0.3262 0.0112 0.0443 
ROAA Return on  average assets  0.0081 0.0087 0.7132 -0.5922 0.0378 
EQTA Ratio of equity to total asset 0.0832 0.0548 0.9988 -0.6322 0.1074 
SDROA 
Standard deviation of ROA from three-year 
rolling window 0.0153 0.0049 0.7311 0.0003 0.0467 
ZROA Z-score based on ROA 41.7830 23.4620 341.5850 -5.8090 54.9370 
ROAE Return on average equity 0.0831 0.1102 9.6712 -7.2452 0.4466 
SDROE 
Standard deviation of ROE from three-year 
rolling window 0.0559 0.0354 0.6950 0.0001 0.0690 
ZROE Z-score based on ROE 49.4890 30.9390 387.0560 -6.5160 58.7830 
CAR Ratio of total capital to risk-weighted assets 0.1756 0.1250 0.9929 0.0008 0.1569 
EQTA Ratio of total equity to total assets 0.0746 0.0487 0.9987 -0.6321 0.1041 
LDR Ratio of total loans to total deposits  0.6587 0.6771 1.3803 0.0001 0.2103 
LLR Ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans 0.0598 0.0344 1.0000 0.0010 0.0094 
LOANG Annual loan growth 0.2704 0.1156 6.9765 -0.9650 0.8969 
OVERHEAD Ratio of operating expenses to total revenue 0.4656 0.3531 45.7500 0.0003 1.2268 
SIZE Logarithm of total average assets 13.1690 13.6090 20.6610 3.8640 3.1690 
INF Annual inflation rate  0.0358 0.0305 0.2075 -0.0395 0.0414 
GDPG Annual real gross domestic product growth 0.0064 0.0063 0.1140 -0.0022 0.0027 
RLAW Rule of law index from Kaufman et al (2008) 0.0387 0.0275 0.1577 0 0.0355 
ECOFREE 
Economic Freedom index from Heritage 
Foundation 60.1197 55.2000 90 42 11.4480 
STOCK Ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP 0.8313 0.4047 5.0050 0.0045 0.9903 
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Table 2. The Lerner index in the Asian banking industry.  
              
 LERNER 
 China Hong Kong Indonesia India South Korea Sri Lanka 
2001 0.570440 0.428638 0.504237 -0.143449 0.395923 0.599729 
2002 -1.560907 0.900392 0.489753 -0.118262 0.273264 0.741071 
2003 -0.999889 0.935591 0.60836 -0.02357 0.410607 0.874385 
2004 0.869676 0.70721 0.76211 0.000143 0.48544 0.915859 
2005 0.822145 0.43478 0.730938 -0.026172 0.492796 0.859094 
2006 0.797429 0.285657 0.688297 -0.075694 0.475937 0.813794 
2007 0.790910 0.366164 0.75164 -0.100164 0.357278 0.704037 
 LERNER 
 Malaysia Philippines Pakistan Thailand Taiwan Vietnam 
2001 0.712439 0.513135 0.571413 0.523875 0.155124 0.152861 
2002 0.742263 0.635231 0.534409 0.498261 0.222008 0.018305 
2003 0.75319 0.732586 0.641901 0.566692 0.271306 -0.192593 
2004 0.766969 0.545519 0.709296 0.721333 0.359072 -0.051874 
2005 0.775379 0.619123 0.666741 0.807386 0.318770 0.135218 
2006 0.738516 0.638452 0.604942 0.761431 0.350857 0.137389 
2007 0.716482 0.669991 0.600564 0.724995 0.334961 0.141521 
 
Source: Authors‟ calculation 
Notes: The Lerner index is calculated using the new industrial organisation approach following Uhida and 
Tsutsui (2005). A higher (lower) Lerner index is associated with an increase (decrease) in market power. 
Moreover, higher market power in the banking industry is associated with lower bank competition. 
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Table 3. The first-stage regression between instrumental variables and market power in the 
banking industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the Lerner index (LERNER). Instruments consist of ECOFREE, RLAW, and 
STOCK. ECOFREE is the Economic Freedom index obtained from Heritage Foundation. RLAW is the Rule of 
Law index obtained from Kaufmann et al (2008). STOCK is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
obtained from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009). LERNER is the market power index calculated from the new 
industrial organization approach following Uchida and Tsutsui (2005). GDPG is the real gross domestic product 
growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. LDR is the ratio of total loans to total deposits. LLR is the ratio of loan loss 
reserves to total loans. LOANG is the annual loan growth rate. SIZE is the logarithm of total average assets. 
OVERHEAD is the ratio of operating expenses to total revenue. A constant is included but not reported. The 
model is estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares method. The t-statistic values are reported in parentheses. 
(***) indicates significance at the 1% level, while (**) and (*) indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
   
Explanatory variables LERNER 
  
ECOFREE 0.0196*** 
 (13.39) 
RLAW -0.346*** 
 (-15.53) 
STOCK 0.0503*** 
 (3.459) 
GDPG 0.0041 
 (1.202) 
INF 1.433*** 
 (5.402) 
LDR 0.1314*** 
 (3.699) 
LLR 0.0387 
 (0.3564) 
LOANG 0.0886*** 
 (5.622) 
OVERHEAD 0.1947*** 
 (5.35) 
SIZE 0.0022 
 (0.6967) 
    
R-square 0.22 
Number of observations 2302 
Table 4. The nexus between market power in banking and financial stability.  
Notes: SDROA (SDROE) is the standard deviation of return on average assets (return on average equity) calculated from a three-period rolling window. ZROA (ZROE) is the 
Z-score index based on return on average assets (return on average equity). LERNER is the Lerner index capturing the degree of bank competition. GDPG is the real gross 
domestic product growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. LDR is the ratio of total loans to total deposits. LLR is the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans. LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. OVERHEAD is the ratio of operating expenses to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total average assets. Estimations are carried out using the Panel 
Least Squares with individual and time fixed-effects (FE), as well as using the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) with individual and time fixed-effects. For those using 
the GMM, LERNER is instrumented with the Economic Freedom index (ECOFREE), the Rule of Law index (RLAW) and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
(STOCK). Hausman test for random effects is provided, as well as J-statistic for over identification condition. The t-statistics values are in parentheses. A constant is included 
but not reported. 
 
              
 SDROA SDROE ZROA ZROE EQTA CAR 
Explanatory variables FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
             
LERNER 0.00095** 0.0022 0.0268*** 0.031* -8.624* -147.1*** -14.766** -203.8*** 0.0075** -0.0428 0.0043 0.1466** 
 (2.0002) (0.5925) (3.139) (0.4759) (-1.944) (-3.317) (-2.886) (-4.135) (2.311) (-1.473) (0.6626) (2.309) 
GDPG 0.00913 0.0906*** 1.961*** 1.965*** -129.21 -360.3** -251.09** -565.3*** 0.107 0.0234 -0.1141 0.1576 
 (1.319) (6.725) (9.775) (8.019) (-1.189) (-2.271) (-2.025) (-3.41) (1.333) (0.2253) (-0.8105) (0.8569) 
INF 0.0091 0.0093 0.0888 0.2238* -4.601 -17.016 4.385 -14.357 0.054 0.0469 0.0479 0.0519 
 (1.319) (1.334) (0.4956) (1.761) (-0.0722) (-0.2062) (0.0602) (-0.1345) (1.157) (0.9679) (0.5683) (0.4477) 
LDR -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.150*** -0.141*** 22.88** 3.169 36.238*** 7.501 0.0859*** 0.0786*** -0.033** -0.0195 
 (-3.766) (-3.339) (-6.866) (-5.689) (1.981) (0.1955) (2.717) (0.3671) (10.051) (5.17) (-2.022) (-0.6507) 
LLR 0.0082** 0.0071* -0.1011 -0.1568** -91.85*** 20.987 -33.41 114.57** -0.255*** -0.2128** 0.1746*** 0.0687 
 (2.551) (1.596) (-0.5759) (-2.019) (-3.258) (0.4103) (-1.038) (2.247) (-12.247) (-2.157) (3.182) (0.6428) 
LOANG -0.000182 -0.00035 0.0019 -0.000392 -6.813** 11.229 -1.822 21.818** -0.014*** -0.0071 -0.036*** -0.047*** 
 (-0.5533) (-0.5913) (0.3951) (-0.0378) (-2.276) (1.623) (-0.533) (2.438) (-6.116) (-1.414) (-8.218) (-3.494) 
OVERHEAD 0.0073*** 0.0073*** 0.0857*** 0.1162*** -32.85*** -31.07*** -28.42*** -26.548** -0.0011 8.33E-05 -0.038*** -0.039*** 
 (7.374) (7.301) (2.087) (6.187) (-3.648) (-2.661) (-2.779) (-2.188) (-0.1714) (0.0097) (-3.249) (-2.906) 
SIZE -0.0008*** -0.001*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 1.5901 10.965*** 6.082*** 18.547*** -0.0014 0.002 -0.00025 -0.0104* 
 (-4.414) (-2.809) (-12.122) (-3.355) (1.013) (3.042) (3.402) (4.395) (-1.227) (0.703) (-0.089) (-1.658) 
                          
R-square 0.5 0.5 0.45 0.47 0.32 0.15 0.24 0.1 0.79 0.76 0.79 0.71 
Hausman test 46.121*** NA 61.699*** NA 35.071*** NA 39.231*** NA 404.52*** NA 203.42*** NA 
J-statistics NA 33.37 NA 44.31 NA 5.3 NA 6.11 NA 2.62 NA 0.69 
Number of observations 1983 1983 1978 1978 1935 1935 1937 1937 1992 1992 1584 1584 
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Table 5. The influence of economic growth on the nexus between market power in banking and financial stability.  
                          
 SDROA SDROE ZROA ZROE EQTA CAR 
Explanatory variables  FE  GMM FE GMM FE GMM  FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
             
LERNER 0.0184*** 0.0514 0.2762*** 1.435** -52.67*** -400.5*** -51.574** -510.6*** -0.0366** -0.1072 0.0737*** 0.2203** 
 (4.175) (1.496) (4.078) (2.421) (-2.612) (-3.753) (-2.396) (-4.491) (-2.459) (-1.348) (2.72) (2.249) 
LERNER*GDPG -0.002*** -0.0101* -0.024*** -0.2059** 4.445** 43.777** 3.72* 53.302*** 0.0044*** 0.011 -0.007*** -0.015 
 (-3.939) (-1.956) (-3.629) (-2.439) (2.239) (2.557) (1.762) (2.957) (3.033) (0.9156) (-2.638) (-0.8571) 
GDPG 0.2714*** 0.4862*** 3.876*** 9.319*** -289.05** -1633*** -383.4*** -2094*** -0.0526 -0.2983 0.1062 0.4935 
 (4.779) (2.959) (4.301) (3.475) (-2.226) (-3.155) (-2.698) (-3.862) (-0.5429) (-0.8073) (0.6501) (1.154) 
INF 0.0302 0.0392 0.3101 0.5468 -12.669 -80.312 -2.115 -85.619 0.0464 0.0344 0.0519 0.0585 
 (1.184) (1.301) (0.5993) (0.934) (-0.1989) (-1.035) (-0.0271) (-0.969) (0.9946) (0.4379) (0.6172) (0.6644) 
LDR -0.027*** -0.041*** -0.278*** -0.523*** 26.493** 64.42** 39.511*** 87.933*** 0.0896*** 0.0944*** -0.0399** -0.0424 
 (-3.815) (-3.743) (-3.227) (-3.401) (2.275) (2.303) (2.785) (2.739) (10.407) (5.146) (-2.417) (-1.326) 
LLR -0.0245 0.0241 -0.18303 0.5327 -96.45*** -171.29* -37.46 -116.15 -0.259*** -0.2621 0.1769*** 0.1337 
 (-1.374) (0.7693) (-0.8067) (1.231) (-3.417) (-1.948) (-1.312) -3.145 (-12.463) (-1.303) (3.231) (1.323) 
LOANG 0.0019 0.0079** 0.0126 0.0863* -6.606** -10.218 -1.639 -0.2866 -0.013*** -0.0124* -0.037*** -0.042*** 
 (1.484) (2.169) (0.8649) (1.851) (-2.208) (-0.9816) (-0.6023) (-1.238) (-6.029) (-1.807) (-8.326) (-4.841) 
OVERHEAD 0.0024 -0.0027 0.1521* 0.0296 -29.49*** -0.3674 -25.58*** 11.975 0.0022 0.0074 -0.043*** -0.048*** 
 (0.6932) (-0.5171) (1.671) (0.2556) (-3.236) (-0.0231) (-2.771) (0.6783) (0.3281) (0.4222) (-3.598) (-2.907) 
SIZE -0.002*** -0.00034 -0.038*** -0.0274 2.361 6.348* 6.718*** 13.118*** -0.00062 0.00084 -0.0017 -0.0078 
 (-4.209) (-0.3008) (-3.604) (-1.513) (1.471) (1.723) (2.792) (3.186) (-0.5404) (0.4165) (-0.5925) (-1.459) 
                          
R-square 0.34 0.35 0.43 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.24 0.23 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78 
Hausman test 133.34*** NA 44.57*** NA 35.04*** NA 38.753*** NA 473.03*** NA 189.89*** NA 
J-statistic NA 6.67 NA 10.18 NA 0.14 NA 0.0102 NA 2.04 NA 0.18 
Number of observations 1983 1983 1978 1978 1935 1935 1937 1937 1992 1992 1584 1584 
Notes: SDROA (SDROE) is the standard deviation of return on average assets (return on average equity) calculated from a three-period rolling window. ZROA (ZROE) is the 
Z-score index based on return on average assets (return on average equity). LERNER is the Lerner index capturing the degree of bank competition. GDPG is the real gross 
domestic product growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. LDR is the ratio of total loans to total deposits. LLR is the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans. LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. OVERHEAD is the ratio of operating expenses to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total average assets. Estimations are carried out using the Panel 
Least Squares with individual and time fixed-effects (FE), as well as using the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) with individual and time fixed-effects. For those using 
the GMM, LERNER is instrumented with the Economic Freedom index (ECOFREE), the Rule of Law index (RLAW) and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
(STOCK). Hausman test for random effects is provided, as well as J-statistic for over identification condition. The t-statistics values are in parentheses. A constant is included 
but not reported. 
